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THE APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TO THE TERMINATION OF




Although Buck v. Bell continues to be "good" law, its premise is no
longer practiced.' Gone are the days when the "mentally disabled" or
mentally retarded were mandatorily sterilized as a condition of dein-
stitutionalization because it was believed "three generations of imbe-
ciles [were] enough."2 However, the underlying belief that persons
* The author received her undergraduate degree from Barnard College,
Columbia University, J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center, Master
of Public Health from the University of Texas Health Science Center at Hous-
ton, and is a Ph.D. candidate in Management and Policy Sciences at the Uni-
versity of Texas Health Science Center at Houston. Her interest is in bioethics
- the interaction of law, medicine and ethics - and she is writing her disserta-,
tion on the medical, legal and ethical issues surrounding assisted reproductive
technologies. She is a member of the American Bar Association and its Health
Law Section, the New York State Bar Association, and the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York where she is an active member of the Science and
Law Committee. All pronouns used in this paper are in the male form for sim-
plicity only.
1. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
2. Id.; As a condition of being released from the State Colony of Epilep-
tics and Feeble Minded, Carrie Buck was to undergo a salpigngectomy, a sur-
gical operation performed by opening the abdominal cavity and cutting the
fallopian tubes to sterilize an individual. This procedure intends to prohibit re-
production of those "defective" persons, who if discharged, would become a
menace, but if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and
become self-supporting. While this procedure is no longer a condition of dein-
stitutionalization, the holding of Buck, permitting the involuntary sterilization
of allegedly feebleminded or defective persons, has never been explicitly
overturned.
In his decision, Justice Holmes opined that the statute in question success-
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with mental disabilities should not reproduce and are inherently un-
able to provide proper parenting to their children survives today.
Although it is not an articulated policy, persons with mental dis-
abilities consistently have their parental rights terminated and rou-
tinely lose their appeals. While terminations are often based on the
fact that the parent is truly incapable of adequately caring for his chil-
dren, the courts seldom apply the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 3 in determining parental rights. The ADA requires that public
entities, such as the courts, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and child protective services, make reasonable modi-
fications to their rules, policies, and practices of the services they pro-
vide in accommodating persons with disabilities that utilize their
services. The services provided by these entities include individual as-
sessments and reunification programs designed to evaluate and assist
persons in developing their parenting skills when their children are
removed from their custody.
As a civil rights statute, Congress enacted the ADA to level the
playing field and facilitate the transition of the disabled into main-
stream society. It aims to remedy ingrained practices of isolating and
segregating persons with disabilities. With proper implementation of
the ADA, individuals with mental disabilities can acquire adequate
parenting skills and will not automatically lose their parental rights.
Part I of this paper traces the events leading up to the present day co-
nundrum, a result of the de-institutionalization of the "mentally dis-
abled" without accompanying and appropriate support services. Part II
addresses the rights of persons with a mental disability to procreate
and to parent, as well as the termination of those parental rights. Part
III focuses on active discrimination in the termination process: the
court's presumptive terminations based on the label "mentally dis-
fully balanced the interests of the disabled with society's interest in eradicating
feeblemindedness, stating, "It would be strange if [the state] could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices.
.. in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence." Id. at 207. The
statute was upheld and Carrie Buck was sterilized. See id. at 208. Given this
decision, it is inexcusable that the unfounded, discriminatory stereotypes of the
early 201h century remain pervasive at the dawn of the 2 1St century. See Jay
Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 30 (1985).
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(1990)..
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abled," and reunification services. This section expands on these ter-
minations by exploring the applicability of the common law require-
ment of individual inquiry and the non-discrimination mandate of Ti-
tle II of the ADA. Part IV reviews whether the ADA would be effec-
tive in altering the practice of preemptively terminating the parental
rights of the "mentally disabled." Finally, Part V concludes that al-
though the best interest of the child should be a factor for considera-
tion, it should not be the sole determinative factor. There must also be
focus on the adequacy of the individual's parenting abilities. At a
minimum, the individual inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court in
Stanley v. Illinois4 and the non-discrimination spirit of the ADA must
be implemented to defeat the erroneous presumption that all mental
disabilities are the same and that a person with a mental disability
translates directly to an inability to adequately parent. The strengths of
the ADA should be exercised to demand that child protective services
(CPS) or the applicable state or local agency make reasonable modifi-
cations to their policies, practices and services, thereby providing
"mentally disabled" parents with appropriate services to meet the par-
enting standards demanded by state statute.
I. THE ROAD TO AND THE RESULT OF
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION FOR PARENTS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
The segregation of persons with mental disabilities entertains a long
history in the United States. Since early in this country's history, per-
sons with mental disabilities were the responsibility of their family or
friends.5 Occasionally, localities passed laws requiring towns to pro-
4. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see also Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding termination of parental rights must adhere to due
process demands).
5. The etiology of insanity was thought to be like that of any other dis-
ease, stemming from God's will. As such, the insane received some public at-
tention and sympathy as those whose condition made them permanently de-
pendent on their relatives or the community. However, little effort was made
to look beyond the disease to the true nature of the affliction. It was believed
that insane people were uncivilized and simply needed to be kept away from
civilized society. This notion was accepted by the public without qualification.
See DAVID ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 4, 109-13 (1990); see also RALPH REISNER ET
AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS
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vide for the lunatics and the insane of the community.6 For example, a
Massachusetts law established that "[w]hen and so often as it shall
happen any person to be incapable to provide for him or herself," then
the town, in the absence of relatives and personal property, must pro-
vide for his relief.7 However, in the absence of such a law, communi-
ties viewed and treated these individuals more as financial burdens
than as ill individuals in need of medical treatment.
8
Those individuals with mental disabilities who did not have familial
support or legal provisions were often banished by their communities.
9
During colonial times and through the latter half of the 18th century,
"madd" persons were sometimes punished as criminals, restrained, or
whipped. 10 These individuals were provided no medical treatment be-
cause none existed. 1 Then, in 1752, at the behest of Benjamin Frank-
lin, the Pennsylvania Assembly established the first hospital that
would admit the poverty-stricken mentally ill. 12 Following Franklin's
lead, the remaining decades of the 18th century witnessed the building
of the first hospital exclusively for the "mentally disabled," as well as
various state statutes providing for the institutionalization of the
"mentally disabled."'13 Finally, in 1842, New York enacted sweeping
637 (1999).
6. See ROTHMAN, supra note 5, at 4.
7. Id.
8. See id.




13. For example, in 1773 the first hospital solely for the mentally ill was
constructed in Williamsburg, Virginia. See ROTHMAN, supra note 5, at 81,
128-29; see also REISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 637. Fifteen years later, the
State of New York enacted legislation to lock up the "furiously mad." See id
By the 1820s, New York and Pennsylvania began a legislative movement that
spread throughout the Northeast, and resulted in more institutions and more in-
carcerations. These institutions were not focused on healing, but on separating
"offenders" from society. It took decades for mental illness to be seen not as
result of God's will, but as a result of physiological and sociological factors.
With this knowledge, reformers felt obligated to shift the burden to the com-
munity and to educate the public. See ROTHMAN, supra note 5, at 81, 128-29;
see also REISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 637. This enlightenment led to an in-
creased desire to "commit" the mentally ill, to provide them with their own
world in institutions that would "isolate them from the dangers loose in the
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legislation targeting the "mentally disabled." Unlike previous legisla-
tion that was narrow in its coverage, this new legislation utilized less
discriminatory methods. It required the confinement of all "lunatics."'
14
This continuous escalation of "commitment authority" arose from the
increase of societal interdependency, governmental ubiquity, and im-
provements in the care of the "mentally disabled." 15
From the "Packard era"'16 of the 1860s through the 1970s, states en-
community." Id.
14. REISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 637-38.
15. See id In 1860, Ms. Packard was committed under a statute that read,
"Married women and infants, who -in the judgment of the superintendent are
evidently insane or distracted, may be received and detained in the hospital at
the request of the husband, or [the] guardian of the infants, without the evi-
dence of insanity or distraction required in other cases." Id. at 638. Appar-
ently, the primary evidence supporting Packard's commitment under this stat-
ute was provided by two doctors, one of whom stated she was rational but was
a "religious bigot like Henry Ward Beecher and Horace Greeley," and the sec-
ond of whom opined that her ideas were "novel." Id. After her release three
years later, Packard campaigned against laws and practices which permitted
hospitalization solely on the basis of a person's opinions with no attempt to
gauge moral accountability. See id. Her efforts were aided by the publication
of "muckraking" books describing pitiful hospital conditions. See REISNER ET
AL., supra note 5, at 638. By the 1890s, many states adopted statutes which
required a jury determination of the commitment issue, authorized the presence
of counsel at the hearing, and criminally penalized anyone who knowingly
sought the illegal commitment of another.
The period from 1860 through the 1890s became known as the "Packard
era." It was represented by a movement toward legalizing the commitment
process by introducing juries into the process. However, this juristic influence
was short lived. By 1971, thirty-one states provided for commitment based
solely on the certification of one or more physicians that the individual suf-
fered from mental illness and needed treatment. See id.
16. Before 1810, only a few eastern states had private institutions to care
for the mentally ill, and only Virginia had a public asylum. But by the 1830s
New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Ohio, Tennessee and Georgia had con-
structed asylums. See ROTHMAN, supra note 5, at 130-31; see also REISNER ET
AL., supra note 5, at 637-38. By 1850, almost every northeastern and mid-
western legislature supported an asylum. See ROTHMAN, supra note 5, at 130-
31. By 1860, twenty-eight of the thirty-three states had public institutions for
the insane. See id By the closing decades of the 19th century the commitment
movement was well established. See id. This movement was not a product of
desperate, frightened communities, but rather it was based on the notion that
insanity could be cured if the individual were in the right environment. See id.
392 Journal of Contemporiy Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:387
acted laws aimed at facilitating commitment. These laws were often
quite successful. A well-developed culture of paternalism and fear up-
held the traditions of segregating and isolating persons with disabili-
ties. At that time, a lack of understanding about the nature of mental
disabilities, the needs of the disabled, and effective treatments for dis-
abilities permeated through society. In response, the government pro-
vided limited monetary assistance to the disabled, namely worker's
compensation and Social Security disability insurance, to allow the
disabled to exist, while relegating them to the outer fringes of main-
stream society.
During the second half of the 2 0th century, minds opened and atti-
tudes slowly changed. This shift fostered the realization that all people
have worth and potential, including the institutionalized and people
with disabilities, who many believed would only demonstrate their
worth and potential by being included in everyday activities of main-
stream society. Two significant factors signified this trend. First, in
the 1960s the tentacles of the civil rights movement reached far and
wide to embrace the disabled, providing an impetus for the deinstitu-
tionalization of those with mental disabilities. Subsequently, the 1970s
ushered in an increase in the recognition of the legal rights of minori-
ties, witnessing specific achievements for children and adults with
mental disabilities in both education and services.' 7 Other significant
factors contributing .to the receding of paternalistic isolation and seg-
regation during this time included the advent of inexpensive psycho-
tropic medication, which offered quick and successful treatment to
large numbers of persons, and the passage of the Community Mental
Health Centers Act, which provided funding for outpatient treatment
centers.18 Following these advancements, the 1970s and 1980s ex-
posed many loopholes and gaps in disability rights and legislation.
After much research, debate, and consideration, President George
Bush signed the most comprehensive and complete law concerning
Americans with disabilities in 1990: the ADA.
Despite ubiquitous disability legislation and the transition to com-
munity-based facilities and outpatient treatment, the revolving door of
the mental health hospital continues to spin. With the strangling con-
17. See Thp Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 791-95 (1973); Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq.
(1975).
18. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 642.
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straints of managed care, subpar insurance coverage and access, in-
adequate and insufficient aftercare programs for discharged patients
are sadly the standard. Without continued care, many individuals
spend a lifetime in the revolving door. Thus, those with mental dis-
abilities often receive effective cursory care, but no quality long-term
maintenance programs or skills training.
The trend toward de-institutionalization, coupled with the aban-
donment of the premise of Bell, at least in practice, yielded a signifi-
cant increase in persons with mental disabilities parenting children. 19
This increase has met with a paralleled increase in the termination of
the parental rights of those individuals labeled "mentally disabled. 20
This action and reaction pushes the issue of the parental rights of per-
sons with mental disabilities back under the microscope, the likes of
which have not been seen since the Supreme Court's review of Bell
almost seventy-five years ago.
II. THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
TO PROCREATE AND TO PARENT AND THE TERMINATION OF
THOSE PARENTAL RIGHTS
As the "mentally disabled" acclimate themselves to mainstream
modern society, the desire for the same attributes which most "nor-
mal" humans wish for grows. They want independence to choose
where they live, work, earn a living, to engage in relationships both
social and romantic, and to have children. 21 While society has lowered
and eliminated some of the fortifications to these achievements, it has
strengthened or complicated others.22 The domain of parental rights is
one notable example of the latter.
19. See generally Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The American With Dis-
abilities Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Dis-
abled or Mentally Retarded, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1415 (1995).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id See generally JAY MATTHEWS, A MOTHER'S TOUCH: THE
TIFFANY CALLO STORY (1992). In A MOTHER'S TOUCH, the question of
whether it is fair and legal for a society to tell some of its members that they
cannot look forward to raising children because they are disabled, is posed and
explored through the poignant story of one mother. See id.
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A. The Right of Individuals with Mental Disabilities to
Procreate,
All too frequently lawyers, judges, social workers, and psycholo-
gists, equate "mentally disabled" with the inability to adequately par-
ent, thus terminating rights unjustly. Because there have been few at-
tempts by government to limit procreation by individuals with or
without mental disabilities, almost no guidance exists concerning the
right to procreate. 23 Yet on several occasions, the Supreme Court indi-
cates strong support for a married couple's right to procreate,24 with
lower court judges referring to such a right in dicta.25 Although these
cases did not involve a state's attempt to prevent married couples from
procreating, they suggest that if confronted with a direct limitation on
a married couple's desire to reproduce by sexual intercourse, the Court
would explicitly recognize such a right.26 A series of cases allude to
this unwritten right to procreate, recognizing a potential right that
would equally extend to persons with mental disabilities. 27 Given the
dismissive attitude toward Bell and the increasingly progressive atti-
tude regarding the "mentally disabled", proving a compelling govern-
ment interest would be extremely difficult for state legislation.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,28 the Court struck down a mandatory ster-
ilization law for thieves, but not embezzlers. 29 The Court resolved the
issue on equal protection grounds, stressing the importance of mar-
riage and procreation as among "the basic civil rights of man. 3° In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "marriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
31
23. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 35 (1994).
24. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 3S (1994).
25. See ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 35.
26. See ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 3S.
27. If the Supreme Court was to specifically announce a right to procreate
it would undoubtedly fall under the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring a com-
pelling governmental interest to limit the right of the "mentally disabled" to
bear and beget children. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(suggesting that the standard for restricting coital reproduction, even for
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Such statements suggest that laws restricting coital reproduction must
pass strict constitutional scrutiny by articulating a compelling state
interest that could not be met in any other manner.
32
The sentiment eschewing the value of procreation and parenting
finds support in other Supreme Court decisions as well. In Meyer v.
Nebraska,33 the Court affirmed the right of parents to permit their
children to learn a foreign language in school, stating that constitu-
tional liberty encompassed "the right of an individual to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children." 34 In Stanley, the Court resolved
questions surrounding an unmarried father's right to rear his child, in
favor of the father, finding that "the rights to conceive and raise one's
children have been deemed 'essential', 'basic civil rights of man', and
'rights far more precious than property rights'. 35 When a pregnant
teacher wished to continue teaching, the Court in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur36 supported her decision, holding that "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 37 Furthermore, John Robertson suggests that Eisenstadt
v. Baird provided the most "ringing endorsement" of the right to pro-
create, extending the right to obtain contraceptives to unmarried per-
sons.38  This ringing endorsement emanated from Justice Brennan
when he penned, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 39 More recently,
Justice O'Connor, in Casey v. Planned Parenthood, wrote,
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, childrearing and' education.
[T]hese matters, involving the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
32. See ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 36.
33. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
34. Id. at 399.
35. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 65 1.
36. 414 U.S. 632 (1973).
37. Id. at 639-40.
38. See 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); ROBERTSON, supra note 23, at 36.
39. 405 U.S. at 453.
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the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Although dicta, these strong statements appear to include individu-
als with mental disabilities among those to whom "our law affords
constitutional protection."
Such statements suggest that a married couple's right to procreate is
recognized even by conservative justices because coital reproduction
is traditionally recognized as one of the main functions of marriage
and family.41 The holding's singular language suggests that this lib-
erty interest would apply to all persons: "mentally disabled," physi-
cally disabled, and married and unmarried alike. Although most of the
Supreme Court dicta cited above pertains to married couples, a strong
argument can parlay this right to all persons, specifically persons with
mental disabilities.42 Individuals with mental disabilities may have the
same or similar needs and desires to have and rear biological descen-
dants as do married persons.43 They may also be excellent childrearers
and supportive parents. To ban procreation by persons with mental
disabilities seems inconsistent given that these persons cannot be
forced to use contraception, abort, or relinquish an illegitimate child,
unless other extenuating circumstances exist.
44
Most recently, in Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court an-
nounced that "whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the
right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal
significance - the right to procreate and the right to avoid procrea-
tion. 45 In Davis, the court attempted to balance the desire of Mary
Sue Davis to either use the cryopreserved pre-embryos of her and her
40. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis added); see also ROBERTSON, su-
pra note 23, at 37, n.46. Additionally, it is often thought that the government
takes a very passive role in child rearing. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 405 U.S.
205 (1972) (permitting Amish families to home school their children because
of their religious belief). However, other cases demonstrate the contrary posi-
tion. See e.g., Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 625 N.E.2d 580
(Mass. 1995) (holding condom availability in public schools does not infringe
on a parent's right to familial privacy, parental liberty or the free exercise of
religion); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 344 (1990) (upholding parental no-
tification requirement for minors seeking an abortion).
41. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
42. See ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 4S; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453;
Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
43. See ROBERTSON, supra note 24, at 4S.
44. See id.
45. 842 S.W.2d 598, 601 (1992).
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then husband to procreate, or to donate them for others to use to pro-
create, against Junior Davis' right to avoid any such procreation.4 6 The
court acknowledged that the scale tipped in favor of the woman's right
to procreate quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth which said, "[i]n
as much as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is
more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between
the two, the balance weighs in her favor.,
47
Ultimately, the court found in favor of Junior Davis' right not to
procreate because Mary Sue Davis wished to donate the pre-embryos
to another couple as opposed to having them implanted in her uterus. 48
Despite this ultimate outcome, the court believed "the case would be
closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the pre-embryos herself,
but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other means. 49
This statement provides strong evidence that if directly challenged,
courts may recognize a right to procreate for all women alike, sug-
gesting that under certain circumstances the right to procreate might
outweigh the right to avoid procreation.
Despite this seemingly rational argument, it remains unclear how
the Supreme Court would resolve a challenge to an unmarried person,
or an unmarried disabled person's right to procreate. The right to pro-
cure contraceptives and continue a pregnancy does not necessarily im-
plicate a single person's right to conceive.50 This is notable because all
actions that may lead to procreation are not protected by a constitu-
tional right. For example, the Court has never acknowledged a right to
engage in fornication, adultery, rape or incest, even though such ac-
tivity could lead to procreation.51 Moreover, the Court might be ex-
tremely reluctant to strike down fornication laws on the ground that
they interfere with non-marital procreation, much less recognize the
right to engage in adulterous, polygamous, or incestuous sex.52 Simi-
larly, they certainly would not strike down rape statutes as an in-
fringement on procreative liberty.5 3 However, the dicta in Davis, cou-




49. Id at 604.
50. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
51. See ROBERTSON, supra note 23 at 38.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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occurred out of wedlock, could influence the Court in effectuating
laws prohibiting non-marital sex or penalizing procreation by persons
with mental disabilities.54
B. The Right of Individuals with Mental Disabilities to Parent
Whether the courts specifically articulate a right to reproduce does
not affect the parental rights that vest once a child is born. 55 The free-
dom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental lib-
erty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 "It is cardinal
that the custody, care and nurture of a child reside first in the
parents." 7 The right to parent and exercise control over the upbringing
of one's child emanates from many of the same cases used to argue for
a right to reproduce.
58
As early as 1923, the Court in Meyer defined parental rights as a
constitutional liberty encompassing "the right of an individual to...
bring up children." 59 However, parental rights differ from the right to
procreate in that they are not absolute - they have long been balanced
against the best interest of the child. 60 The courts may say little about
54. See id; Robert J. Samuelson, The Politics of Ignorance, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 45.
55. Under English common law a father possessed ultimate parental rights.
His rights encompassed the custody, labor and service of his children, as if the
children were his property. In the United States, this doctrine metamorpho-
sized over the years to afford both mother and father parental rights and to con-
sider the interest of the child. See Francis B. McCarthy, The Confused Con-
stitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 975
(1988).
56. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752; see also Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651-52;
see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); see Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); see LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639-40
(1974); see Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
57. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); In re Sego, 82
Wash. 2d 736 (1973) (stating that permanent depravation of parental rights
should only be allowed for the most powerful reasons).
58. See infra Part Ill(A).
59. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (affirming a parent's right to have their child
learn a foreign language).
60. See id; Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1939) (holding that the
"right of parental control is a natural, but not inalienable one."); Shaw v.
Shelby County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 584 N.E.2d 595 (1992) ("parental inter-
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the right to conceive a child, however once the child is born, via the
legal doctrine of parens patriae,61 the state assumes an overriding in-
terest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its children to
where it may regulate the parent-child relationship.
62
This tension between parental rights and the state's interest in pro-
tecting children is amplified in the area of termination of parental
rights.63 For example, a state may completely terminate parents' rights
without their consent if the parent fails to adequately care for his child
and the court accedes to due process demands.64 The burden on the
state is to prove by clear and convincing evidence the unfitness of the
parent, while remaining mindful that the parents' "fundamental liberty
ests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interest in deter-
mining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.").
61. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1991). Parens patriae liter-
ally means "parent of the country" and is used to describe a state acting as a
guardian for persons with legal disabilities such as children and incompetents.
Under parens patriae, the state's goal is to provide children with permanent
homes and therefore the state's interest favors preservation not dismantling of
natural familial bonds. See Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b. 1.(a)(i-ii).
62. See e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (holding compulsory school atten-
dance statute facially valid except as applied to Amish); Meyer, 262 U.S. at
399 (affirming the right of parents to allow their children to learn a foreign
language because constitutional liberty encompasses "the right of any individ-
ual to bring up children.").
63. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 1432.
64. Tina, John III, Jed, Jeremy, and James Santosky are the biological
children of John and Annie Santosky. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 751. In No-
vember, Tina was removed from her home by Mr. Kramer, the commissioner
of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, on the basis of parental
neglect. See id. Ten months later, John III was also removed. See id Jed was
born on the day of John III's removal, and three days later was taken from his
parents to avoid imminent danger to his life or health. See id. In the years
following these removals, Jeremy and James were born but never removed
from their parent's care. See id. at 752, n.5.
John and Annie Santosky challenged the preponderance of the evidence
standard. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752. In addressing the issue, the Supreme
Court held that parental rights are fundamental rights subject to due process,
and that "when the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753; Lassiter v.
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981) (Blackmun J., dissenting) (stating
"state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [a]
child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due
Process Clause").
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interest in the care, custody, and management of their child is pro-
tected by the 14th Amendment and does not evaporate simply because
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of
their child to the state.,,65 While Santosky clarified that parental inter-
est in the care and management of their child is a fundamental liberty
interest, the state must implement fundamentally fair procedures in the
termination process. In applying the tripartite balancing test, the state
must support any allegation arising in the process with clear and con-
vincing evidence. The tripartite test requires the balancing of three
distinct factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2)
the risk of error created by the states chosen procedure; and (3) the
countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged
procedure .66
However, Santosky did not provide guidance as to the substantive
aspects of parental rights termination. Each state may uniquely define
"unfit parent," with the only stipulation being that no state can estab-
lish unfitness based solely on an ascribed status such as marital status
or race. 67 Assuming in arguendo, that persons with mental disabili-
ties, like all other citizens, have the right to parent, courts must en-
force this proclamation with respect to parents with mental disabilities
to defeat the unarticulated, but practiced presumption, that "mentally
disabled" is synonymous with the inability to adequately parent. Pro-
cedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individual
inquiry, however, when the procedure forecloses the determinative is-
sues of competence and care and explicitly disdains present realities in
deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks "running roughshod
over the important interests of both parent and child., 68 Having de-
65. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752-54, 769.
66. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335 (1976); see also Lassiter,
452 U.S. at 27-31, 37-48 (affirming the use of the tripartite test articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge).
67. This stipulation can easily be extrapolated to include "mentally dis-
abled" as an ascribed status. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (requiring states to
prove parental unfitness through "individual inquiry" in overturning a lower
courts decision to terminate an unwed father's parental rights simply because
he was not married); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (reaffirming
Stanley by declaring it unconstitutional to change the custody of a child based
solely on the fact that the custodial white mother was cohabiting with a black
male).
68. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
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tailed the procedural sine qua non the state courts must follow, the
next section tackles the substantive aspect of parental unfitness and
states actions to impeding parental rights.
C. The Termination of Parental Rights of
Individuals with Mental Disabilities
1. Termination Requirements
The Santosky Court acknowledged that "permanent neglect pro-
ceedings [parental rights termination proceedings] employ imprecise
standards that leave the determination unusually open to the subjective
values of the judge."69.As a consequence, the Court bestowed com-
plete discretion upon state statutes to describe the requirements for the
termination of parental rights and to outline the orchestration of the
termination procedure. From this discretion, some states exercise a
multi-statute scheme providing for intervention and termination within
one statute. 70 However, whether by a single or multiple statutes, ter-
mination of parental rights is generally predicated on the parental "un-
fitness" standard. Some states, such as Illinois, detail eighteen factors
to consider in determining unfitness, any one of which is sufficient to
terminate parental rights, 71 while other states provide broader pa-
rameters for the courts by not attempting to define unfitness.72 Despite
the spectrum, almost every statute routinely includes mental or psy-
chiatric disability and developmental disability - under various pseu-
donyms - as factors for courts to consider."
Whether specifically articulated or not, courts regularly sweep a la-
bel of "mental deficiency" under the "unfitness" or "incapacitated"
69. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762.
70. See e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7800-7895 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300-395 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-7-1572 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994).
71. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/1 D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (spe-
cifically citing mental impairment, mental illness or mental retardation).
72. See e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-5-4(c) (1995); IOWA CODE § 232.116 (l)(e)
(1987 Cum. Supp.); MINN. STAT. § 260.221(b) (1986); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2511 (a)(5) (Supp. 1995).
73. See e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-5-4(c)(1995); IOWA CODE § 232.116(l)(e)
(1987 Cum. Supp.); MINN. STAT. § 260.221(b) (1986); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 251 l(a)(5) (Supp. 1995); see also Watkins, supra note 19, at 1435.
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umbrella when determining termination of parental rights.74 All too
often there appears a presumption that "mentally disabled" means an
inability to adequately parent, without proving a nexus between the
disability and its manifestations, or an individualized inquiry.
2. The Termination Process
In many cases, the parental rights termination process is initiated by
an anonymous neighbor, physician, or teacher who reports suspected
abuse. 75 However, those with mental disabilities often have regular
contact with various governmental professionals who are familiar with
child protection services. In this situation, it is most often from these
professionals that a report resonates. When a report stems from such a
source, there is a high probability of intervention, great weight given
to the validity of the report, and discretion given to the "mentally dis-
abled" or perceived "mentally disabled" parents. 76 After an investiga-
tion, if immediate termination of parental rights is neither adjudicated
nor are the charges dismissed, a child may be temporarily removed
from his parents' home.
Throughout the removal period, there are usually a series of hear-
ings to determine the status and ultimate resolution of the situation.77
During this period of removal, most statutes require the state to for-
mulate and implement a family reunification plan. Reunification plans
most often implemented include drug or alcohol treatment, parenting
classes and other skills training. To supersede this reunification re-
quirement, the state must provide sufficient evidence that reunification
is not, and never will be, in the best interest of the child. 8
At any step in the process, societal prejudices, myths, and miscon-
ceptions may rear their heads, thus terminating the parental right of
parents with mental disabilities. In most instances, during the period
of removal, the court meets every six months to weigh whether the
parents should regain custody of the child, or whether the situation
74. See In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282 (Me. 1993); In re K.F., 437 N.W.2d
559 (Iowa 1989); R. G. v. Marion County Office, Dep't of Family & Children,
647 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
75. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 1435.
76. See id. at 1436.
77. See generally Watkins, supra note 19 (detailing the termination re-
quirements and process); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745 (describing the termination
process).
78. See generally Watkins, supra note 19. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745.
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should be maintained.79 If a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that a child can be safely returned to his parents, reunification will oc-
cur.80 If it is determined that the parents are making progress and re-
unification is possible in the future, removal and reunification plans
will be maintained. If it is determined that it is not possible for the
parents to regain custody of the child, a foster placement will be ex-
tended, parental rights terminated, and the child made eligible for
adoption.
III. FOCAL POINTS OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE TERMINATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Discrimination can occur at any point in the parental rights termi-
nation process. This discrimination is evident in two distinct focal
points. First, statues which permit mental disability as a factor, but not
the only factor for terminating parental rights, and statutes that require
a nexus between mental disability and inadequate parenting ability are
interpreted such that the mere label of mental disability constitutes
grounds for parental rights termination. Thus, parental rights can ter-
minate on the single presumption that mental disability translates to an
inability to parent. As a result, there is often no individual inquiry or
individual assessment conducted to determine the person ability to
parent. Second, the label of being "mentally disabled" may preclude
an individual from receiving appropriately modified reunification
services or from receiving any services at all.
A. Discrimination by Presumption: Mental Disability
Translates Directly to Inability to Adequately Parent
While great strides have occurred in assimilating many disabled
persons into mainstream society, long held prejudices do not fade
quickly. Courts continue to perceive a parental relationship involving
a person with a mental disability as less than normal.8' The presump-
79. See id
80. Of note is that the preponderance of the evidence standard is different
than the clear and convincing evidence standard requirement used to terminate
parental rights.
81. See In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. 1979). William
and Ellen Carney were married in 1968 and separated in 1973. See id At that
time, Ellen relinquished custody of their two sons to William. See id William
and his boys moved to California where William met and began living with a
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tion that all persons with mental disabilities are similar and unable to
be fit parents remains pervasive. 2
Persons sharing the label of "mentally disabled" often share no
common symptomology 8 3 This broad label of "mentally disabled"
covers developmental difficulties such as mental retardation, manic
depression and schizophrenia. These persons can exhibit a spectrum of
perceptual and communicative deficits, but the extent and nature of
these deficits are individually endemic. 8 4 Additionally, illness and in-
telligence do not remain static. 85 Some "mentally disabled" persons
can be cured, while others maintain their disability with medication or
86therapy. Moreover, those specifically labeled "mentally retarded" or
"mentally disabled" can increase their memory and comprehensive ca-
female named Lori. See id. One year later, William and Lori had a daughter
and Lori raised all the children as her own. See id.
An accident in 1976 left William a quadriplegic. See Carney, 598 P.2d at
37. During his rehabilitation and recovery William's children visited him sev-
eral times a week and William came home in a modified van which enabled
him to drive. See id In 1977, William filed for divorce from Ellen. See id. at
38. Ellen in return filed for full custody despite the undisputed fact that Ellen
had not visited her sons nor contributed to their support during the previous
five years. See id The court awarded custody to Ellen finding that because
William was not able to play sports with his sons or take them fishing, Wil-
liam's custody "wouldn't be a normal relationship between father and boys."
Id. at41.
The decision was eventually overturned but illustrates how disabled parents
are presumptively labeled unable to parent. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 42 (de-
claring that, "if a person has a physical handicap it is impermissible for the
court to simply rely on the condition of prima facie evidence of the person's
unfitness as a parent or of probable detriment to the child."); In re B.W., 629
P.2d 742, 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) ("the removal of a child from the legal
custody of a parent who suffers from a handicap cannot be presumed to be in
the best interest of the child based on the fact of the handicap alone."); See
generally Michael Ashley Stein, Book Review: Mommy Has a Blue Wheel-
chair: Recognizing the Parental Rights of Individuals With Disabilities, 60
BROOK. L. REv. 1069 (1994).
82. See generally supra note 81 and accompanying text.
83. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 1423. What they do share, however, is
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pabilities - in essence they can learn how to learn - contrary to many
erroneously held prejudices.8 7
Although some courts acknowledge "mentally disabled" persons are
not "all cut from the same pattern . . .they range from those whose
disability is not immediately evident to those who must be constantly
cared for,"88 traditional myths and stereotypes perpetuate the judicial
presumption of unfitness.8 9 This presumption of unfitness is not re-
served only for parents with mental disabilities. In Carney v. Carney,
the court found a parent with a physical disability unable to "do any-
thing for [his] boys .. .except maybe talk to them and teach them,
[and] be a tutor, which is-good but not good enough." 90 On appeal, the
California Supreme Court reprimanded the superior court for "stereo-
typ[ing] William as a person deemed forever unable to be a good par-
ent simply because he was physically handicapped." 9' Similarly, this
rationale from Carney emanates into other perceived disabilities as
well. In other instances, parents who are deaf are viewed as incapable
of effectively stimulating language skills,92 while parents who are
blind are thought to be unable to provide their children necessary at-
tention or discipline.93 And, as in Carney, courts routinely find parents
with spinal cord injuries and other physical impairments unequipped
to adequately supervise their children. 94 The holdings in these cases,
against the interests of the parents, evidence the fact that the presump-
87. It is important for a judge to be able to assess a disabled person's non-
obvious strengths, and to reinforce these strengths to serve both the parent,
child, and states' interests in preserving familial bonds. See Watkins, supra
note 19, at 1423; Stone v. Daviess County Div. of Children and Family Serv.,
656 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1995) (reporting that expert testimony has established
that there is no correlation between a low I.Q. and the ability to parent); see
also EDWARD ZIGLER & ROBERT M. HODAPP, UNDERSTANDING MENTAL
RETARDATION 86-88 (1986).
88. City of Cleburn v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
89. ABRAHAM MASLOW & BETA MITTELMANN, THE MEANING OF
"HEALTHY" ("NORMAL") AND OF "SICK" ("ABNORMAL") IN CONCEPTS OF
HEALTH AND DISEASE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 47 (Arthur L. Cap-
lan et al. eds., 1981).
90. Carney, 598 P.2d at 40.
91. Id. at 42.
92. Christensen v. L.A. County Bureau of Adoptions, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323,
327-28 (1967).
93. See In re B.W., 626 P.2d at 743.
94. See Carney, 598 P.2d at 39-4 1.
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tion of unfitness is shallow, discriminatory, and inaccurate.
1. The Laws Prohibiting Discrimination by Presumption: The
Supreme Court, Professor Laura Rothstein and the Model
Marriage and Divorce Act All Concur
It is impermissible and discriminatory for courts to presume unfit-
ness and terminate parental rights solely on the basis of the attributed
label "disabled," according to the Supreme Court, scholars, statutes,
and commentators. First, the Supreme Court explicitly requires that
states prove unfitness through individual inquiry and not by presump-
tions based solely on ascribed status.95 Any proof of unfitness must be
achieved by clear and convincing evidence because the ultimate ter-
mination of the fundamental right to parent is irrevocable. 96 Second,
Professor Laura Rothstein, a preeminent disabilities scholar, argues
that "in all cases ... the standard should be to determine the best in-
terest of the child, with the handicap of the parents being only a factor
for consideration, rather than as establishing any kind of presumption
of unfitness." 97 A similar standard to Professor Rothstein's is an-
nounced in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, a standard adopted
in eight states.98 Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act provides that the following factors be balanced in determining
custody decisions:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child
with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school,
and community; (5) the mental and physical health of
all individuals involved.99
95. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658 (holding a state must prove unfitness
through individual inquiry rather than through presumptions based on ascribed
status); Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 429.
96. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747.
97. LAURA ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS
186 (1984).
98. Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1992). The
eight states that have adopted the Act are: Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana and Washington.
99. Id.
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Finally, commentator Michael Stein suggests a qualification to the
Rothstein/Model Act standard. "When courts weigh 'the handicap of
parents' as a 'factor for consideration,' they must appreciate that cer-
tain parental tasks performed by ...disabled [individuals] in ways
different from those mainstream society considers 'normal,' may nev-
ertheless constitute an equally valid performance of those tasks."'00
2. The ADA and Its Application
Another powerful argument prohibiting termination of parental
rights based solely on an individual's disability stems from the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act,'0' a statute seldom exercised in the context
of parental rights termination.
Public policy concerning disabilities arose in the early part of the
2 0th century with income-maintenance programs such as workers'
compensation, vocational rehabilitation programs, and Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI). 10 2 Despite these efforts, the predominant
attitude toward Americans with disabilities during most of the 2 0th
century remained one of paternalism, an attitude manifested in separa-
tism. 10 3 Not until the 1960s, spurred by Brown v. Board of
Education,0 4 did a shift occur away from separation of certain groups
toward recognition of the worth and potential of all persons.0 5
During the ensuing three decades, great strides occurred with re-
spect to individuals with disabilities in the area of education. Two
lower court decisions, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Chil-
dren (PARC) v. Pennsylvania10 6 and Mills v. Board of Education"7
100. Stein, supra note 78, at 1052.
101. See42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.
102. See LAURA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW 6 (1995); see generally
EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY (1987).
103. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, at 6.
104. 347 U.S. 438 (1954) (declaring that segregation on the basis of race
was inherently unequal).
105. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, at 6-7.
106. 334 F. Supp 1257 (E.D. Pa 1971), reh'g. 343 F. Supp 279 (E.D. Pa
1972) (where plaintiffs proffered the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection argu-
ments to prevent the Pennsylvania school system from continuing to exclude
and treat children with disabilities differently).
107. 348 F. Supp 886 (D.D.C. 1972) (approving detailed procedural safe-
guards to ensure that the substantive rights of children with disabilities, to be
treated similarly and equally, were enforced).
408 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 16:387
proved the catalyst for the passage of the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act'0 8 in 1975, an Act known today as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Together, these laws pro-
vided that all children with disabilities be educated under an individu-
alized program, in the least restrictive environment, at no cost. At
roughly the same time, in 1973, Congress passed the Rehabilitation
Act,'0 9 an offspring of earlier vocational rehabilitation policy. It pro-
vided that the federal government, federal contractors, and recipients
of federal financial assistance could not discriminate on the basis of a
handicap against an otherwise qualified individual. 10 Thus by 1973,
nondiscrimination policies existed in public education and other areas
where the federal government claimed jurisdiction. Additionally, a
disconnected, non-comprehensive array of state statutes and common
law provided limited protection for individuals with disabilities.",
However, these non-discrimination laws were embraced slowly,
leaving the largest portion of society, the private sector, without man-
date. Not until almost two decades after the enactment of the Reha-
bilitation Act did Congress pass the ADA to provide blanket protec-
tion for otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities." 2 As its
premise, the ADA prohibits discrimination based on a disability in
public and private employment (Title I), public services offered by
state and local governments (Title II), and public accommodations
provided by private entities (Title III)."'
Initially, Congress perceived discrimination against the disabled to
be most often the product not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness, indifference, and of benign neglect."14 In reaction,
Representative Vanik described the treatment of the handicapped as
one of the country's "shameful oversights" which caused the handi-
108. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
(1975).
109. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (1973).
110. See id.
!11. The Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-4157 (1968); The
Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1972); The Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081; The Air Carrier
Access Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1986); and The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §
3601 etseq. (1988).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.
113. See id.
114. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
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capped to live among society "shunted aside, hidden, and ignored."' 15
Thus, in passing the ADA, Congress acknowledged that approximately
forty-three million Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities and that historically, society tended to isolate and segre-
gate these individuals without providing ample legal recourse.' 6 Be-
cause of this perceived isolation, two of the primary purposes of the
ADA are to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities,"' and to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause, in order to address the major areas of discrimina-
tion faced by people with disabilities."
3. Application of the ADA to the Termination of Parental Rights
Process
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of a dis-
ability by public entities.1 19 For purposes of the Act a public entity is:
(1) any state or local government; (2) any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or states or local
government; or (3) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and
any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Pas-
senger Service Act). 20 The regulations addressing the implementation
of Title II state that Title II applies to "all services, programs, and ac-
115. Id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1-4). The reference to 43 million Ameri-
cans with disabilities does not include the approximately five million persons
who suffer from bi-polar disorder and the two million persons who suffer from
schizophrenia. See id.
117. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102. A public entity shall make a reasonable
modification in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. See 28 U.S.C. §
12101(b) (1). Additional purposes include: to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals, and; to
ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the stan-
dards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities. See
id.
118. "[Tlhe Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(8).
119. See28 U.S.C. § 12131.
120. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.102.
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tivities provided or made available by public entities. , 12 Accordingly,
in relation to parental rights termination proceedings, state and local
courts, governmental agencies such as Child Protective Services
(CPS), Child Welfare Services (CWS), and state or the local HHS are
covered under this Title. 122 Additional pertinent parts of Title II with
respect to individual inquiry into the termination of parental rights and
the provision of reunification services mandate that "[n]o qualified in-
dividual 23 with a disability124 shall, on the basis of disability, be ex-
cluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimina-
tion by any public entity.' 25 Furthermore, a public entity shall ad-
minister services, programs, and activities in the most integrated set-
ting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities. 26 Finally, the statute clarifies that reasonable accommo-
121. Id.
122. Similarly, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act would be applicable
to federal courts. However, for simplicity this discussion will focus on the
ADA with the acknowledgement that a parallel argument could be made at the
federal level under the Rehabilitation Act.
123. A qualified individual with a disability is
an individual who, with or without reasonable modifica-
tions to the rules, policies, or practices, the removal of ar-
chitectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or
the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the es-
sential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services
or the participation in programs or activities provided by
a public entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
124. Disability with respect to an individual includes "[a] physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life ac-
tivities of that individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded
as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (A-C). The phrase
physical or mental impairment is defined as: A) Any physiological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: Neurological, musculosketal, reproductive, di-
gestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, akin and endocrine. 28 C.F.R. §
104 (1999).
125. A pubic entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not on
the basis of disability "deny a qualified individual with a disability the op-
portunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service" or "oth-
erwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid,
benefit, or service." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(i)(vii) (1999).
126. A public entity shall make a reasonable modification in policies,
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dations are required unless the public entity can show that modifica-
tions would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or
activity.
121
Title II of the ADA applies to the termination of parental rights be-
cause the termination process is administered by the courts and state
agencies providing the reunification services, programs, and
activities.1 28 Specifically, the services that courts and various agencies
provide during the termination of parental rights process, subject to
ADA scrutiny, and substantive and procedural due process in the ter-
mination of parental rights, are the provision and use of reunification
services and programs. A person with a mental disability is a quali-
fied individual with a disability for purposes of falling under services
provided by the state. Therefore, with an otherwise qualified individ-
ual before the court, it is impermissible for the court to remove a child
from parental custody or terminate parental rights based solely on the
parent's disability without looking past an ascribed label and provid-
ing an individual inquiry into the abilities of the parent. It is similarly
impermissible for any agency involved in this process not to provide
or modify services offered to non-disabled persons, or to provide them
in an integrated setting.
The application of the ADA once again brings to the foreground the
fundamental rights of a parent to raise their child as they wish, simul-
taneously competing with the state's interest in protecting children.
On closer scrutiny this conflict is easily resolved. A state may not dis-
criminate against a "mentally disabled" parent simply because they are
perceived as "mentally disabled. ' However, the state can and must
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid dis-
crimination on the basis of disability. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (b)(7) (1999);
See, e.g., Cable v. Dep't of Developmental Serv. of Cal., 973 F. Supp. 937
(Cal. Dist. Ct. 1997) (holding that a public entity's failure to provide services
to otherwise qualified persons with disabilities in the "most integrated setting
appropriate" is actionable under Title II of the ADA).
127. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (b) (7).
128. See In re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wash. App. 222, 230 (1995) (holding
that the ADA applies to services provided by the state in termination proceed-
ings); In re Angel B., 659 A.2d 277, 279 (Me. 1995); but cf In re Antony B., 54
Conn. App. 463, 472 (1999) (holding that "the ADA neither provides a defense
to nor creates special obligations in a termination proceeding."); In re B.S., 166
Vt. 345, 351-52 (1997) (finding the ADA did not provide a defense to termina-
tion proceedings but a separate cause of action for an alleged violation of an
individual's civil rights).
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remove a child from his parents even if the parent is disabled when,
even with modified services, the parent is found unable to adequately
provide for the child. Title II of the ADA, the Stanley decision, Pro-
fessor Laura Rothstein's suggestions, and the Model Marriage and Di-
vorce Act all comply in demanding that the state and its agencies
make individual inquires - that it remain blind to labels and societal
prejudices to properly serve justice, the parents and the child.
B. Discrimination in Administration: Lack of, and
Unmodified, Reunification Services
When a child is removed from his parent's custody it is presumably
because the parents are not adequately caring for their child. Most of-
ten the state, in an effort to avoid breaking up families and to expedite
reunifications, provides services and programs to assist the parents in
eliminating or diminishing the attributes that produce their unfit status.
These services may include any of a vast array of programs such as:
assisting parents in finding permanent or suitable housing and jobs,
teaching money management and parenting skills, offering educational
enhancement, providing mental health counseling, and drug or alcohol
treatment. 129 However, all too often where reunification services are
at issue, these services are neither offered, nor modified appropriately
to accommodate parents with mental disabilities. This practice is
more common and more blatant than the discrimination so far dis-
cussed.
1. No Services Offered and the Laws Broken by Such Inaction
Almost all parental rights termination statutes require, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, that the state provide reunification services to a
parent before the final termination of his rights. 130 This requirement to
provide services is conditioned on the assumption that these services
will be beneficial. If the state establishes with clear and convincing
evidence that the provision of services would not, or could not, allevi-
ate the circumstances that necessitate custodial removal, services need
129. See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 300-395 (West 1984 & Supp.
1995) (explicitly requiring the provision of renunciation services); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 384-b(7) (McKinney 1992) (implicitly requiring the provision of
renunciation services as a show of "diligent efforts" to preserve the family
unit).
130. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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not be provided.' 31 Unfortunately, the state easily satisfies the clear
and convincing evidence standard by arguing that no services could
alleviate the circumstances, i.e., the mental disability of the parent, on
which the termination is predicated.
To proffer such causation is erroneous and illegal. First, it is inac-
curate to assume that proper services could not, in certain cases, eradi-
cate mental disabilities such as learning disabilities, developmental
delay or depression. Second, it is illegal to condition services on the
elimination of the circumstances that brought about the termination
proceedings if that circumstance is the label of "mental disability.'
132
It is not the disability that must be removed, but rather the inadequa-
cies of the person's parenting skills. To predicate services on the
elimination of a parent's disability violates the ADA and the Due Pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The key is that the termi-
nation must be catalyzed by the parent's inability to care for his child,
not merely because he has a disability.
Yet, some states need not provide services to parents with mental
disabilities if a court determines that the parent is not likely to receive
a benefit from them. This too is an unacceptable scheme. First, a
judge, possibly the same judge that wished to remove a child from the
home on the presumption that the label of "mental disability" means
inability to parent, is rarely properly educated to make determinations
about whether a disabled parent would receive benefit from a state-
sponsored service program. It would be prudent for the judge to enlist
the evaluative assistance of a variety of professionals, namely, psy-
chiatrists, psychologists, social workers, or other appropriately edu-
cated professionals to provide an individual, not generalized, assess-
ment in arriving at a fundamentally fair conclusion.
Second, although the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of a
disability in the provision of services by a public entity, a parent's dis-
ability can exacerbate discrimination by acting as a dichotomous det-
riment. This occurs when a disability initiates the primary intervention
and removal of a child, prohibiting the parent from receiving the bene-
fits offered to assist non-disabled parents in regaining custody of their
children. 133 Two cases exemplify this dichotomy.
131. See id.
132. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
133. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 167.
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In Orangeberg County Dep't of Social Services v. Harley,134 a
mother diagnosed as borderline mentally retarded had her parental
rights terminated before the state offered any reunification services.
3 5
Despite the mother's protests that she did not receive any services to
help her meet the goals imposed on her by the state in the initial re-
moval of the children, the trial court terminated her parental rights.
3 6
In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court relied on the
testimony of a clinical psychologist who declared the mother incom-
petent to parent because she was "immature, displayed poor impulse
control, [and] had a low frustration level" due to her "low mental
status." The court ignored the issue of whether or not reunification
services were offered because the governing statute permitted termi-
nation in the absence of such services.' 37 In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied on the psychologist's expert testimony even though he
only saw Ms. Harley twice, once in 1983 and once 1987.138 Thus, the
court erred in giving undue deference to one expert's testimony and
ignored the possibility that this individual could ameliorate the state's
grievances with any state assistance.
Similarly, in S.T. v. State Dep't of Human Resources,139 the Ala-
bama Court of Appeals upheld the removal of a two-day-old infant
from her mother based almost exclusively on testimony of a clinical
psychologist that parents with the mother's IQ were incapable of car-
ing for children. 40 Research assessing the abilities of individuals with
134. 393 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
135. See id. at 598. The court in Harley relied upon Humphrey, a case
whose holding is even more permissive and offensive than Harley. See S. C.
Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Humphreys, 374 S.E. 2d 922, 925 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)
(permitting termination in the absence of services when the termination is
based on a diagnosable mental deficiency).
136. See Harley, 393 S.E.2d at 598.
137. See id. South Carolina permits termination of parental rights "if the
parent has a diagnosable condition unlikely to change within a reasonable time
such as ... mental deficiency, [or] mental illness ... and the condition makes
the parent unlikely to provide minimally acceptable care." Id. There is no
edict proffered by the state of South Carolina demanding that reunification
services be offered, nor any suggestion that the state would modify services if
they were offered.
138. See id.
139. 579 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
140. See id. at 641 (noting that the mother was diagnosed as mildly to
moderately mentally retarded).
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mental retardation, developmental disabilities and low IQ status shows
that the effectiveness of reunification services has tremendous vari-
ance among parents with the same IQ as well as among parents span-
ning the IQ spectrum. 141 The court dismissed this research and waived
the requirement of reunification services, noting that S.T. had no reli-
able support system. 42 "[N]either the social workers nor the psy-
chologists were familiar with any program ... in which retarded par-
ents took care of their children.' 43 Finding for the state, the court
never addressed whether this mother could or could not care for her
child, rather, individual inquiry disappeared in the presence of gross
presumptive discriminatory generalizations.
3. Inadequate or Unmodified Services and the Laws That Demand
More
The failure of courts to look past a label of mental disability, and
their willingness to rely on generalized testimony, rather than individ-
ual inquiry in assessing the provision of services, results in sweeping
termination of parental rights of individuals with mental disabilities.
More common than the complete failure to offer reunification serv-
ices, however, is the failure to offer adequate or reasonably modified
services to parents with mental disabilities. In many cases, reunifica-
tion services are offered pro forma with the one size fits all concept.
Under these circumstances, failure is projected and expected, not from
the parents with the mental disability, but from the judges, social
workers and service providers. Despite their efforts, parents are usu-
ally found unable to improve.
44
One of the leading cases in the area of ADA application to parental
rights is In re Torrence p.,145 where the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's opinion denying application of the ADA to
termination of a father's parental rights. 146 Following the initial termi-
141. See generally Robert L. Hayman Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law,
Politics, and the Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1215
(1990) (concerning the difference in abilities between classes of disabilities
such as mildly and profoundly mentally retarded and within the class of mildly
retarded).
142. See S.T., 579 So.2d at 642.
143. See id.
144. See Watkins, supra note 19, at 168.
145. 522 N.W.2d 243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
146. See id. at 244.
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nation of Raymond's parental rights, the state established require-
ments for the father to maintain contact with the children every other
week, maintain monthly contact with the children's social worker, in-
form the county of any changes in status including his address, and a
suitable residence, before regaining custody. 47 When the termination
of Raymond's parental rights came up for review, Ms. Holbrook,
Raymond's social worker, testified she had eight to ten conversations
with Raymond concerning his desire for contact with his children,
Raymond failed to fulfill the conditions imposed on him by the court,
particularly concerning his address, and she wrote several letters to
Raymond asking him to contact her.' 48 She also testified that there was
no case plan to help Raymond meet these conditions.
49
Although Raymond could not read, 5 ° the court accepted Hol-
brook's testimony that the father's failure to respond to her letters
provided the reason for the state to withhold initiating a reunification
plan. "' The court acknowledged the failure to meet the imposed con-
ditions and the unlikelihood of Raymond meeting them in the future,
even without a reunification plan or service, provided sufficient evi-
dence to permanently terminate Raymond's parental rights. Further-
more, when Raymond asserted that the county violated the ADA by
failing to reasonably accommodate his disabilities in the administra-
tion of reunification services, the court rejected the claim in opining
that the County had no increased duty to the father. 52 Denying appli-
cation of the ADA, the Court of Appeals ruled that the ADA formed a
separate cause of action unrelated to termination proceedings.
153
"Raymond may have a separate cause of action under the ADA based
on the County's actions or inactions; such a claim, however, is not a
147. See id. at 245.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 245.
150. See In re Torrence P., 522 N.W.2d at 245. Raymond was also mildly
"mentally disabled," but he was functional and held a driver's license. See id
151. See id.
152. 522 N.W.2d at 246. Inadequate or unmodified services with respect
to those "mentally disabled" might include failing to: spread parenting class
over a greater than usual amount of time, incorporate creative or proven prac-
tices for teaching, provide transportation, place labels on objects or use note-
cards to improve memory, etc.
153. See id.
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basis to attack the [termination] order."'
15 4
Unfortunately, In re Torrence P. is more the rule than the excep-
tion. 5 5 The Vermont Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. In
In re H.S.,156 the court upheld the termination of a mother's parental
rights because of her limited progress in unmodified parenting classes
taught by a counselor who had no experience working with parents
who have mental disabilities.'57 H.S.'s mother, S.S., possessed a low
IQ, however, she appeared capable of living independently and did not
have a legal guardian.' 58 In August of 1990, Social and Rehabilitation
Services (SRS) for the State of Vermont received two reports, one
154. Id.
155. See In re H.S., 632 A.2d 1106 (Vt. 1993) (termination upheld even
after acknowledging the absence of any services available in the State of Ver-
mont to assist a parent with developmental disabilities). In In re Christina L.,
Christina was removed from her mother's care at two and one half years of age
after an anonymous call alerted the State to the child's poor living conditions. 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 1992). At the outset, the State believed that
Christine's mother was "likely to fail" in meeting the conditions for reunifica-
tion. See id.
In an apparent effort to fulfill its obligation, the State failed to provide
reunification services for the first eight months of the removal. See id. at 684-
85. In reality, the State only provided a social worker who testified that she
had no expertise in helping people with developmental disabilities. See id. at
683. Furthermore, the psychologist who evaluated the mother one year after
the removal testified that initiating therapy at that time was too late. See id at
684. The doctor further testified that the social workers did not comply with
what the doctor believed were necessary and adequate services. See id., 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 684. The mother, after complying with many of the State's man-
dates for reunification, became distrustful of the service providers because she
came to view them as part of the system that took her daughter away and be-
cause there was no progress made toward reunification. See id. Additionally,
because the services were not appropriately modified, she told the social
worker that she only wanted to work on one objective at a time. See id
In spite of the State's acknowledged actions, the fact that the initial re-
moval was based on inadequate housing, and the court's concession that this
was a tragic case, the court upheld the lower court's decision to terminate the
mother's parental rights. See'id. at 689. The court reached this decision be-
cause they believed that the mother lacked an acceptable parent-child relation-
ship and because she was uncooperative, neither of which was related to the
initial reason for removal. See id.
156. 632 A.2d 1106.
157. See id. at 1107.
158. See id. at 1106.
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stating that H.S. fell off the back of a pick-up truck, while another
claimed S.S. grabbed her son and hit him in the chest. 59 Based on
these reports, SRS removed H.S. from S.S.'s custody. The disposition
order compelled S.S. to participate in a "parent-in-distress" program,
vocational rehabilitation, and substance abuse screening.
60
The resolution of the case turned on S.S.'s progress in the parenting
program. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that S.S.
did not make any progress in her parenting skills even though she ex-
uded a positive attitude.161 Unfortunately, S.S.'s lawyer egregiously
failed to make an ADA claim in this case, and the court similarly
failed to recognize that the ADA applies to provision of services by a
public entity like SRS regardless of state case law.' 62 To this conclu-
sion, S.S. proffered that the state failed to provide appropriately modi-
fied reunification services required by statute.' 63 S.S. claimed the
state's inaction violated her statutory rights in part because the parent
educator, while aware of S.S.'s disability, had no training in working
with low-IQ adults or parents, nor did any such training exist in Ver-
mont.164 The court, rejecting S.S.'s argument, claimed that as a matter
of law SRS possessed flexibility in developing case plans and given
this flexibility, there existed no requirement that SRS must provide
counselors trained to work with persons who have mental
disabilities.
65
But there is hope. In In re Victoria M., a California court reversed
and remanded a trial court's issuance of parental rights' termination
because the services provided by the state were not appropriately
modified. 66 The case involved Carmen S., a woman in her mid-
thirties with limited mental capabilities. Even with special classes she
still tested at an IQ level of fifty-eight in 1980 and seventy-two in
1987,167 translating into labels of mild retardation and borderline in-
telligence, respectively. Because of inadequate housing, the Depart-
159. See id. at 1107.
160. See id.
161. See In re H.S., 632 A.2d at 1107.
162. See In re B.S., 166 Vt. At 351 (denying application of the ADA to
termination petitions).
163. See In re H.S., 632 A.2d at 1107.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. In re Victoria M. v. Carmen S., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1317 (1989).
167. See id. at 1322.
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ment of Social Services (DSS) removed her three children and in-
structed Carmen to obtain and maintain adequate housing, acceptable
housekeeping standards, a regular visitation schedule demonstrate ap-
propriate parenting skills, keep the social worker abreast of her current
address at all times, and participate in a counseling program.
68
Carmen received no assistance in obtaining suitable housing and did
not get evaluated by a psychologist because her social worker admit-
tedly did not make the arrangements, but she pleasantly and diligently
participated in the parenting skills classes. Carmen also engaged in a
child abuse prevention program in a limited manner, attended a com-
munity college class designed to assist people who have problems
functioning independently in the community, and visited her children
regularly. 69 When the psychologist finally evaluated Carmen she
found "no signs of bizarre thought or the signs of psychotic sympto-
mology," but that Carmen suffered from an organic syndrome that in-
terferes with her ability to perceive situations and respond appropri-
ately.7 0 However, the psychologist provided no information as to
whether Carmen's condition could be remedied or controlled with
medication. Rather, the final decision to terminate Carmen's parental
rights rested on Carmen's poor performance in her parenting skills
class that was neither tailored, nor modified, to accommodate her
needs. 171 Acknowledging DSS's shortcomings, the court stated if "ge-
neric reunification services are offered to a parent suffering from a
mental incapacity ... failure is inevitable, as is termination of parental
rights."
Reprimanding the lower court for its evaluation of the facts, the ap-
pellate court found that "[tihere [was] nothing in the reunification plan
itself that appears to be tailored to Carmen's intellectual limitations,
and that [the] record [was] clear that no accommodation was made for
Carmen's special needs in providing reunification services. 172 In sup-
port of its decision to reverse and remand, the court reiterated the
holding from In re Camaleta which stated that "[t]he right of parents
to raise their own children is so fundamental that the termination of
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1323.
170. See id. at 1324.
171. See In re Victoria M, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 1329.
172. Id. at 1327, 1329. Note also that this enlightened decision was made
one year prior to the enactment of the ADA.
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that right by the courts must be viewed as a drastic remedy to be ap-
plied only in extreme cases. ' 17 Thus, In re Victoria M provides a
positive step away from a presumptive inadequacy of parents with
mental disabilities and toward individual inquiry and modification of
services.
IV. THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUAL INQUIRY AND THE ADA ON
THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Whether or not there would be a change in the ultimate outcome,
laws must be properly applied to protect parents with mental disabili-
ties, their children, the parent-child bond, and to preserve the integrity
of our government and its laws. The following sections review'and
discuss the potential effect which individual inquiry into parental un-
fitness and adherence to the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate might
have on termination outcomes. While in the majority of cases the ter-
mination of parental rights is an unfortunate but necessary action by
the state to protect the health, safety and welfare of its children, there
are cases where following the law could produce alternate outcomes
and abate unacceptable presumptions and discrimination.
A. No Effect
In the majority of cases, the Stanley decision and the ADA would
have little ultimate effect beyond ensuring fair and equal treatment for
the disabled. However, fair and equal treatment alone necessitates and
urges appropriate application of Stanley and the ADA to these cases.
For example, in In re Elijah R., 174 the Maine Supreme Court upheld
the termination of a mother's rights where Robin R., Elijah R.'s
mother, gave birth while an involuntary patient at the Augusta Mental
Health Institute. 175 Just four days following the birth, the Department
of Human Services (DHS) petitioned the court to have Elijah removed
from his mother's custody, despite the fact that she had not harmed or
neglected her child in any way. 176 The court granted the initial removal
based on the mother's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and her
173. In re Camaleta B., 579 P. 2d 514 (Cal. 1978).
174. In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d 282 (Me. 1993).
175. See id. at 283.
176. See id.
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past abuse of drugs and alcohol.
77
In order to regain custody, the court recommended that Robin obtain
and maintain sobriety, take her medication, attend mental health and
substance abuse counseling, demonstrate the ability to maintain a sta-
ble lifestyle, and attend scheduled visits with Elijah.178 Unfortunately,
Robin did not successfully comply with any of these recommenda-
tions. 79 During the period that Elijah remained in foster care, Robin
continued her substance abuse while hospitalized for psychotic and
substance abuse treatment. She also signed herself out of the hospital
against medical advice and missed appointments with counselors.
Furthermore, during this time her doctor refused to continue proscrib-
ing anti-psychotic medications because he feared a lethal outcome if
she continued her relentless substance abuse while taking prescribed
medication. s
Even if the state provided an initial individualized inquiry and of-
fered modified services, the state probably would have terminated
Robin's parental rights. If during an individualized inquiry it is deter-
mined that a past or continuing history is likely to jeopardize a child,
the child may be removed.' 8' Clearly Robin's past and continued
problems put her child at risk. A court does not, and should not, have
to wait until a child is harmed before intervening to protect him. A
number of factors point to this eventual outcome of parental rights
termination. Robin remained obstinate in refusing to attend any coun-
seling services and continuing to abuse substances, precluding her
from getting potentially effective treatment for her mental illness.
Robin expressed no desires or intentions to achieve and maintain so-
briety. Rather, Robin actions demonstrated with clear and convincing
evidence that she could not, in a reasonable amount of time, care for
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d at 283.
180. See id. at 284. There is no mention of what, if any, services were of-
fered to Robin, nor if any offered services were modified. Although Robin's
paranoid schizophrenia would be considered a disability under the ADA, her
drug and alcohol addictions would not be covered. She would not be a quali-
fied person with a disability for purposes of ADA application. See supra Part
Ill(A)(2). Therefore, the mandates of the ADA would not come into effect until
her substance abuse issues were under control given the lethal dangers of com-
bining drugs, alcohol and anti-psychotic medications.
181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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her child because of her substance abuse and her consequential inabil-
ity to control her schizophrenia.
18 2
Similarly, the outcome would remain unaltered in In the Matter of
the Welfare of N.C.K and NJ.K.183 Both N.C.K. and N.J.K. were
conceived while both parents were involuntary patients at the State
Security Hospital. 8 4 K.K., the twins' mother, remained an inpatient at
the State Security Hospital in St. Peter, Minnesota during the first half
of 1979 and a permanent resident of the hospital for the year prior to
the birth of her twins. She received treatment for both mental illness
and mental retardation, illnesses that required treatment for many
years. The day after the twins were born, the state filed a petition re-
questing removal of the children from their mother's custody,185 which
the court granted. Sometime later, a hearing was held and an evalua-
tion of K.K. ordered. As is common, the petition for removal rested
on the presumption that a mental disability means an inability to par-
ent, rather than on an individualized fitness assessment.
Even if the state agencies followed the law and conducted an indi-
vidualized assessment performed prior to removal, K.K.'s long and
debilitating history of mental illness and mental retardation detailed in
her medical records would have provided sufficient evidence for the
initial removal. 186 Furthermore, even with modified services, K.K.'s
inability to control her unpredictable mood swings, total disregard for
others, antisocial behavior, psychotic episodes, violent and destructive
outbursts, suicidal efforts, and threats to kill her children were highly
unlikely to be eradicated. I8 7 Thus, even with the application of indi-
182. See In re Elijah R., 620 A.2d at 283. Robin had a long history of
mental illness (paranoid schizophrenia) and substance abuse for which she was
hospitalized and treated at various institutions to no avail. See id. According
to Maine state law, the district court may terminate the parental rights if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the
child and the parent has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and
reunify with the child. See id at 284.
183. In re N.C.K. and N.JK., 411 N.W.2d 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
184. See id.
185. See id. Only K.K. appealed the termination of her parental rights.
D.M., the father, permitted the termination of his right by default. See id.
186. See In re N.C.K., 411 N.W.2d at 577. K.K. had been an inpatient at
the State Security Hospital in St. Peter, Minnesota during the first half of 1979
and a permanent resident of the hospital for the year prior to the birth of
N.C.K. and N.J.K. See id.
187. See id. K.K. had received mental health treatment for the majority of
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vidualized inquiry and the ADA, the outcome would remain identical
to the holding in In re Elijah R., and properly so.'
88
Finally, Stone v. The Davies County Division of Children and Fam-
ily Services is an additional case in which the outcome appeared ap-
propriate, but where the court's rationale is incorrect. 89 In Stone, the
appellants argued that the ADA applied to the provision of reunifica-
tion services offered by the state.' 90 The state rebutted this claim by
stating that because the Supreme Court of Indiana does not require
state agencies to prove that it offered services to a parent to assist in
fulfilling parental obligations, the ADA does not apply.' 9' In a case of
first impression, the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the state.
While finding that the state statute does not require that services be
provided, the ADA does require that if services are provided, there is
no discrimination in the provision of the services and that reasonable
modification be made when the person is an "otherwise qualified per-
son with a disability."'192 Here, the court erred in not finding that while
the provision of reunification services are not mandatory in the state of
Indiana, services were provided on a routine basis and these services
were required to be modified in accordance with the ADA.
B. Potential Effect
Finally, there is evidence of productive application of the ADA. In
In re P.A.B., a Pennsylvania appellate court displayed admirable in-
her twenty-two years to no avail. Additionally, two psychiatrists testified that
she was unable to attain a level at which she would be able to successfully care
for her children. The psychiatrists testified that it was likely that she would kill
the children if they were relinquished to her care. See id.
188. Other cases in which the application of the mandates would not have
altered the outcome include In re David G., 659 A.2d 859 (Me. 1995) (exam-
ining a case where David G.'s mother had been treated for manic depression
and psychotic delusions for more than fifteen years), and In re J. W.D., 456
N.W.2d 214 (Iowa 1990) (observing that J.W.D.'s mother had borderline in-
tellectual functioning with a secondary disability of an adjustment reaction
with depressed mood disorder). See also In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274 (Minn.
1986). Although the ADA had not been passed at the time this case was de-
cided, it would have had little effect on the ultimate disposition because of her
mother's epilepsy and blackouts.
189. See Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 824.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. 28 U.S.C. § 12111 (8).
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sight in reversing a lower court's order to terminate the parental rights
of a couple who were both "developmentally disabled."' 93 Although
the parents met the statutory grounds for termination, the court con-
ducted an individualized inquiry and considered the facts. The parents'
social workers described them as loving, as having made considerable
efforts to maintain a relationship with their children during the period
of removal, fully cooperative with the court's suggestions, and enthu-
siastically participating in the required programs to make them better
parents. 194 The team of social workers, educators and therapists con-
cluded that it was in the best interest of the children to return them to
their parents. 95 The appellate court boldly announced its agreement
with the team of professionals in reversing the trial court's decision.
Similarly, in In re Welfare of Joshua R., the mandates of the ADA
were applied in an exemplary manner even though the court ultimately
upheld the parental rights termination. 9 6 On appeal, the parents of
Joshua R. argued that the Department of Social Health Services failed
to tailor their reunification services to the ADA. In denying the claim,
the court detailed in its decision exactly how the services were modi-
fied for the couple with mental retardation and a host of developmen-
tal problems. For example, pictorial instructions and picture prompts
were used to convey various parenting skills and housekeeping tech-
niques. 197 The court also found that the child care instruction em-
ployed visual, rather than literary teaching aids, involving repetition,
193. See In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
194. See id. One reason why the parents met the statutory requirements for
termination was because rather than attribute any inability of the parents to the
removal of their children, the trial court used the parents label of "mentally
disabled" as the condition for removal. The statutory grounds for the termina-
tion in question are: (1) their children had been removed for six months; (2) the
condition that led to removal (the parents' mental disabilities not their inability
to parent) persisted; (3) the parents could not remedy the condition in a reason-
able time (they could not become un-mentally disabled, although they could
become better parents); and (4) services were not likely to bring about a rem-
edy of the condition (services would not make them un-mentally disabled but
they did make them better parents). It is this common misapplication of simi-
lar statutes which results in unnecessary terminations.
195. See id.
196. See In re Joshua R., Sharon R. and Marty R. v. the Dep't of Soc. and
Health Serv., 91 Wash. App. 1073 (1998).
197. See id.
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routine, and feedback to insure understanding. 198  Additionally,
Joshua's prescribed medication was altered to accommodate Sharon's
difficulties in remembering to refrigerate and administer the medica-
tion.199 By tendering these details, the court strongly supported its de-
cision with gifted ideas, techniques and strategies for modifying reuni-
fication services to agencies and departments that confront these is-
sues.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is not written to argue that the parental rights of indi-
viduals with mental disabilities should never be terminated, nor that
the best interest of the children be sacrificed in the name of disability
rights. There are many times when the rights of parents under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA must be subordinated to protect
the rights and safety of children.2 0 Rather, this Article exposes the
lack of individual inquiry and discriminatory practices in the termina-
tion of the parental rights of persons with mental disabilities, to bring
the ADA to the attention of parents, social workers, therapists and at-
torneys who are unaware of the statute, its power, and its application
to the termination process. Furthermore, it suggests that states look
beyond labels, presumptions and IQ scores, and eliminate their use as




200. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34 (announcing a parent's constitutional
rights may be overcome if the health or safety of their child is in jeopardy);
Stone, 656 N.E.2d. at 287; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (stating that, "the rights to
conceive and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential', 'basic civil
rights of man', and 'rights far more precious than property rights'."); Casey,
505 U.S. at 851 (announcing that "our law affords constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family re-
lationships, childrearing and education. [T]hese matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
201. In re L.L., C.L. and C.L., 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1815 (1997). In re
L.L. provides a perfect example of the need to familiarize parents and attorneys
with the ADA. Here, the court dismissed the appellant's claim that the state
failed to appropriately modify the services to accommodate his disabilities
stating, "Lawrence [the appellant] offers no argument or discussion regarding
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Very often, parents with mental disabilities cannot adequately care
for their children. Yet, regardless of their inabilities, these individuals
deserve to have the laws equally applied and enforced. Their rights
may be subordinated to the interest of the child, but should not be dis-
regarded or violated. These individuals are owed an individual inquiry
into their alleged unfitness and adherence to nondiscrimination princi-
ples.
However, it is without question that even if these two fundamental
mandates are consistently employed, the result will often be the same
- the termination of the parent's rights. But more importantly, if these
mandates are practiced, there will be judicial fairness and equity for
all parents. Parenting ability would increase for those who could suc-
ceed if programs were modified and ultimately some families pre-
served. This should be the future focus in cases involving the ADA -
affirming the triad of justice, non-discrimination and familial bonds.
why the ADA applies in this situation or how it was violated. We do not ad-
dress issues not adequately briefed and argued by the parties." Id.; see also
generally In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463; In re W.G. and P.G., 597 N.W.
2d 430 (S.D. 1999); In re T.A.G., 1999 Mt. 142 (1999); In re C.M., S.M., D.M.
and J.M., 996 S.W. 2d 269, (Tex. 1999); Knudson v. Hess, 1996 S.D. 137, 556
N.W. 2d 73 (S.D. 1996); Klinker v. Beach, 547 N.W. 2d 572 (S.D. 1996); In re
Shawn W., 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4226 (1996).
